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Abstract
This paper deals with the detection and prediction of losses due to cyber attacks waged on
vital networks. The accumulation of losses to a network during a series of attacks is modeled
by a 2-dimensional monotone random walk process as observed by an independent delayed
renewal process. The first component of the process is associated with the number of nodes
(such as routers or operational sites) incapacitated by successive attacks. Each node has a
weight associated with its incapacitation (such as loss of operational capacity or financial cost
associated with repair), and the second component models the cumulative weight associated
with the nodes lost. Each component has a fixed threshold, and crossing of a threshold by
either component represents the network entering a critical condition. Results are given as joint
functionals of the predicted time of the first observed threshold crossing along with the values
of each component upon this time.
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1 Introduction
Background Information. Complex large-scale networks form an integral part of our defense
system and infrastructure: e.g. wireless communication networks, the Internet, multifunctional
sensor networks, large-scale computer networks, and electrical grids. They play crucial roles in
military and civilian installations and in biological research. A network can be regarded as a graph
with nodes representing individual sensors, computers or servers, and so on, and edges connecting
individual nodes. Such nodes are subject to failures of various origins, such as natural disasters,
hostile attacks (e.g. cyber attacks), and benign hardware failures. Hostile attacks are prevalent
instances of network disruptions and they are a growing threat to national security.
In the past decade, we have observed intense cyber attacks, some of which have hindered proper
operation of the computer networks of banks, private corporations, government facilities, and even
vital infrastructure. In each situation, conventional security measures were unable to prevent such
significant failures of security and the associated financial costs. Thus, it stands to reason to offer
unconventional tools that may minimize the damage to networks. One of the common measures is
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to disconnect the intact portion of a network from the rest of it before incurring critical damage, but
how does one recognize the threat and manage the network once an attack begins? In this article
we lay out a foundation for predicting the time and caliber of potentially destructive damage to a
network by means of statistics and operational calculus.
Once an attack is launched, we seek to determine how much damage it will potentially cause
and the time until a specified critical amount of damage is incurred. We model processes of attacks
and cumulative losses of nodes and weights to predict both the time and size of critical damage.
Further, we embellish the basic model by adding an auxiliary robustness threshold and analyze the
fluctuation of the process about this intermediate threshold prior to entering a critical stage, which
yields a more refined analysis of the nature of the accumulation of damage. This allows one to
rank various risks to the network by considering the time between threshold crossings, which may,
for example, be applied to early detection of hostile attacks and differentiation between attacks
and benign hardware failures. Values of the thresholds can be determined heuristically, through
optimization, or monitored upon the observation of incoming damage.
Modeling Networks. As mentioned, networks can be modeled by graphs, and particularly
weighted graphs, in which each edge or node is associated with a weight representing, for example,
cost, bandwidth, distance, strength of social ties, energy, gravitational force, liquidity in financial
networks, or probabilities. Random graphs are also commonly used, e.g. classical Erdo¨s-Re`nyi
random graphs consist of n vertices with M edges chosen uniformly at random from all possible
adjacencies, but we instead consider graphs with random node weights whose original structure can
further be randomly altered.
It is often thought that cyber attacks spread from one node to another along the graph as a
branching process, but this is an incomplete picture for several reasons. Firstly, attacks often have
multiple simultaneous targets (e.g. machines linked to a targeted router or servers housing virtualized
machines) or victims quarantine groups of machines in response to attack detection, both of which
result in batch losses. Further, the viral aspect of cyber attacks is significantly mitigated by firewalls,
and viral attacks that do elude firewalls tend to practically immediately infect subnetworks (due
to the structure of highly interconnected clusters that characterizes large-scale networks). Lastly,
some of the most prevalent attacks are not necessarily viral at all (e.g. distributed denial-of-service
attacks).
Incoming damage to a network is subject to a complex process. An attack disables successive
nodes and edges, effectively removing a subgraph with a random number of nodes with random
associated weights (due to both the value of incident edges and intrinsic node value). Furthermore,
such a network under attack is observed at potentially random epochs of time, as the losses become
apparent. The spread of the damage is one of the most distinctive elements of a hostile action, so
we predict its caliber using methods of stochastic analysis.
Related Literature. Combating cyber crime involves various mathematical modeling and
methods, as well as those of non-mathematical nature (such as prevention, physical and electronic
defense mechanisms, and intelligence, which do not pertain to our article). Thus, we mention a
few areas of current research on this topic and some literature known to the authors. Random
and deterministic graph theory is probably the most common area for studying networking [2, 3, 5,
10-15, 19, 23-27, 30-32] although just a few [5, 23, 24] focused on potential cyber crime. Random
walk and fluctuation analysis is an important hybrid in tools and modeling of interest, although the
authors [1, 6-9, 17-18, 28] did not have cyber crime in mind. There are also theoretical aspects of
fluctuation analysis and applications to finance, physics, and other sciences that relate to the topic
[2, 6, 16, 20, 28, 29].
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The Layout of the Paper. In Section 2, we begin with a model of a process where attacks
occur according to a marked point process in time, with two-dimensional marks representing the
cumulative nodes and weight lost up to time t under delayed observation upon random time epochs.
We derive a joint functional of each component as the process (node loss, weight loss, and time) at
the first observed exit from [0,M ]× [0, V ] and at one observation prior.
In Section 3, we extend the model to include an auxiliary robustness threshold for the node
loss component, M1 < M . We derive a joint functional of the components of the process at both
the first observed exit of the node component from [0,M1], the observed exit of the process from
[0,M ] × [0, V ], and one observation prior to each for the “confined” process, under the restriction
that the first observed M1 crossing precedes the major crossing.
The key technique in preserving the wide generality of our results in Sections 2 and 3 is to derive
them under a composition of a number of operators of two types: the Laplace-Carson transform
and so-called D-operator, the latter of which is introduced in some past work of one of the co-
authors. Yet the flexibility and tractability of the inverses of these operators allows the reduction of
the general formulas to fully explicit formulas for practical cases. We demonstrate this in Sections
4 and 5, where we will derive closed-form, explicit formulas for two sets of realistic probabilistic
assumptions. Among other things, we derive explicit probabilistic results, including joint transforms
of the process upon the M1 and major crossings, which yield marginal transforms of each component
at each observed crossing time and the time between the two observed crossings.
2 A Basic Model
Consider an infinite weighted graph in which weights are associated with nodes rather than
edges. In reality there are not infinite graphs, but this assumption appropriately models large-scale
networks. During a series of attacks, successive batches of nodes are incapacitated upon random
time increments. Associated with each node is a random weight representing its value to the health
of the network. We suppose the network enters a critical state wherein it may become dysfunctional
if the number of nodes incapacitated by hostile attacks exceeds a fixed integer threshold M or the
magnitude of weights associated with the compromised nodes exceeds a fixed real threshold W . We
proceed with more formalism of the model.
Let (Ω,F (Ω) , P ) be a probability space and let
η = N ⊗W =
∑
k≥1
(nk, wk) εtk (2.1)
where εa is a Dirac point measure, be a marked Poisson random measure on this probability space
describing the evolution of damage taken to a network, where
nk nodes are destroyed at time tk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,
wk =
nk∑
j=1
wjk is the nonnegative real weight associated with the nk nodes
and the underlying support counting measure
∑∞
k=1 εtk is Poisson of rate λ directed by λ |·|, where
|·| is the Borel-Lebesgue measure on B (R+).
We assume that nk’s are iid (and independent of wjk’s) with common marginal PGF (probability-
generating function) g (z), and wjk’s are iid with common LST (Laplace-Stieltjes transform) l (u)
for j, k ∈ N.
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By straightforward probability arguments we obtain the following representation for η in terms
of its dependent components N and W:
E
[
zN (T )e−vW(T )
]
= eλ|T |[g(zl(v))−1], Re (v) ≥ 0, |z| ≤ 1 (2.2)
where T is a Borel subset of R+ and |T | denotes the Borel-Lebesgue measure of set T .
Now, suppose η is observed by a delayed renewal process
T =
∞∑
n=0
ετn (2.3)
and let
∆n = τn − τn−1, n ∈ N, be iid and independent of ∆0 = τ0 (2.4)
such that
L0 (θ) = E
[
e−θ∆0
]
, Re (θ) ≥ 0 (the LST of ∆0 = τ0) (2.5)
L (θ) = E
[
e−θ∆1
]
, Re (θ) ≥ 0 (the common LST of ∆n = τn − τn−1, n ∈ Z>0) (2.6)
Then, by Lemma A.1 (Appendix) and (2.2),
E
[
zN ([0,τ0])e−vW([0,τ0])−θτ0
]
= L0 [θ + λ− λg [zl (v)]] = γ0 (z, v, θ) (2.7)
E
[
zN ((τ0,τ1])e−vW((τ0,τ1])−θ∆1
]
= L [θ + λ− λg [zl (v)]] = γ (z, v, θ) (2.8)
are the functionals describing the total number of lost nodes and their associated weights observed
within time intervals [0, τ0] and (τ0, τ1], respectively. Since the increments are iid, the second corre-
sponds to any (τn−1, τn].
Now, introduce a generic marked delayed renewal process
X ⊗ Y ⊗ T =
∞∑
n=0
(Xn, Yn) ετn (2.9)
with mutually dependent components
(Xn, Yn) : Ω→ N× R+
whose relationship to the network will be explained later. Denote
Nn =
n∑
i=0
Xi and Wn =
n∑
i=0
Yi. (2.10)
Introduce the random indices
µ := inf {n ≥ 0 : Nn > M} for a fixed positive integer M (2.11)
ν := inf {n ≥ 0 : Wn > V } for a fixed positive real number V (2.12)
called the exit indices.
We would say that the component X is terminated at time τµ,and component Y is terminated at
time τν if X and Y acted alone, but we seek the first time either component terminates. If the original
marked Poisson process η is observed by a delayed renewal process T , then the embedded process
will exhibit (mutually dependent) increments Xn and Yn as the marks in the process X ⊗ Y ⊗ T .
4
Such an observed process is regarded as “terminated” at time min{τµ, τν}, the first observed passage
time, which represents delayed information regarding the actual real-time crossing which occurred
earlier.
First, we consider the confined process on trace σ-algebra F (Ω)∩ {µ < ν}, i.e. the process with
component X being terminated first, and thus the first observed passage time τµ will be the exit
time by the confined process. Equation (2.2.9) will be modified as
(X ⊗ Y ⊗ T )µ =
µ∑
n=0
(Xn, Yn) ετn (2.13)
which gives a more precise definition of the process observed until τµ. We do the same for the
confined processes on F(Ω) ∩ {µ = ν} and F(Ω) ∩ {µ > ν}.
Then, we define the first observed passage index,
ρ = min {µ, ν} = inf {n : (Nn,Wn) /∈ [0,M ]× [0, V ]} . (2.14)
Throughout the rest of this section, we consider various marginal and semi-marginal variants of
the joint functional
Φ = Φ (α0, α, β0, β, h0, h) = E
[
α
Nρ−1
0 α
Nρe−β0Wρ−1−βWρe−h0τρ−1−hτρ
]
= E
[
α
Nµ−1
0 α
Nµe−β0Wµ−1−βWµ−h0τµ−1−hτµ1{µ<ν}
]
+ E
[
α
Nµ−1
0 α
Nµe−β0Wµ−1−βWµ−h0τµ−1−hτµ1{µ=ν}
]
+ E
[
α
Nν−1
0 α
Nνe−β0Wν−1−βWν−h0τν−1−hτν1{µ>ν}
]
= Φµ<ν + Φµ=ν + Φµ>ν (2.15)
of the observed process upon the first observed passage time τmin{µ,ν} and pre-observed passage time
τmin{µ,ν}−1.The latter is of particular interest due to the crudeness of the observed process.
The following transforms will be vital in the derivation of explicit results in the upcoming sections.
Denote
Dpq = LCq ◦ Dp (2.16)
Here LCq is the Laplace-Carson transform:
LCq (·) (y) = y
∫ ∞
q=0
e−yq (·) dq, Re (y) > 0 (2.17)
with the inverse
LC−1y (·)(q) = L−1y
(
·1
y
)
(q) (2.18)
where L−1y is the inverse of the Laplace transform.
The operator Dp is defined as
Dp (f) (x) = (1− x)
∞∑
p=0
xpf (p) , ‖x‖ < 1 (2.19)
where {f (p)} is a sequence, with the inverse
Dkx (·) = lim
x→0
1
k!
∂r
∂xr
[
1
1− x ·
]
, k ≥ 0, and Dkx = 0, for k < 0. (2.20)
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such that Dkx(Dp{f(p)}) = f(k). Then, the full inverse operator is
D−1xy (·) (p, q) = LC−1y (Dpx (·)) (q) . (2.21)
The upcoming results for the joint transforms from (2.15) will be derived under the inverse of
composed operator Dpq. The utility of D
−1
xy is at the heart of the derivation of joint and marginal
transforms, which can yield results such as moments and distributions, of the components of process
(X ⊗ Y ⊗ T )µ upon threshold crossings in a fully explicit form.
The below Theorem 2.1 establishes an analytically tractable formula for Φµ<ν .With (2.7)-(2.8),
we abbreviate
γ = γ (α0αx, β0 + β + y, h0 + h) (2.22)
γ0 = γ0 (α0αx, β0 + β + y, h0 + h) (2.23)
Γ = γ (αx, β + y, h) (2.24)
Γ0 = γ0 (αx, β + y, h) (2.25)
Γ 1 = γ (α, β + y, h) (2.26)
Γ 10 = γ0 (α, β + y, h) (2.27)
Theorem 2.1. In light of abbreviations (2.22)-(2.27), the functional Φµ<ν of the process on the
trace σ-algebra F (Ω) ∩ {µ < ν} satisfies the following formula:
Φµ<ν =D
−1
xy
(
Γ 10 − Γ0 + γ01−γ
(
Γ 1 − Γ )) (M,V ) (2.28)
where D−1xy is the inverse of operator D introduced in (2.16).
Proof. Introduce the families of indices
µ (p) = inf {j : Nj > p} (2.29)
ν (q) = inf {k : Wk > q} (2.30)
and
Φµ(p)<ν(q) = E
[
α
Nµ(p)−1
0 α
Nµ(p)e−β0Wµ(p)−1−βWµ(p)−h0τµ(p)−1−hτµ(p)1{µ(p)<ν(q)}
]
(2.31)
In particular, we have
Φµ<ν = Φµ(M)<ν(V ). (2.32)
Application of Dpq to Φµ(p)ν(q) will bypass all terms except 1{µ(p)<ν(q)}. Thus, after applying
the operator Dpq to random family
{
1{µ(p)=j,ν(q)=k} : p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0
}
we arrive at
Dpq
(
1{µ(p)=j,ν(q)=k}
)
(x, y) =
(
xNj−1 − xNj) (e−yWk−1 − e−yWk) (2.33)
We first notice that
1{µ(p)=j,ν(q)=k} =
(
1{Nj−1≤p}1{Nj>p}
) (
1{Wk−1≤q}1{Wk>q}
)
(2.34)
Then, we have
Dpq
(
1{µ(p)=j,ν(q)=k}
)
(x, y) = y (1− x)
Nj−1∑
p=Nj−1
xp
∫ Wk
q=Wk−1
e−yqdq (2.35)
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which yields (2.33). Denote
Ψ (x, y) = Dpq
(
Φµ(p)ν(q)
)
(x, y) . (2.36)
Since
Φµ(p)<ν(q) =
∑
j≥0
∑
k>j
E
[
α
Nj−1
0 α
Nje−β0Wj−1−βWj−h0τj−1−hτj1{µ(p)=j, ν(q)=k}
]
(2.37)
by Fubini’s Theorem and (2.37), we have
Ψ(x, y) =
∑
j≥0
∑
k>j
E
[
α
Nj−1
0 α
Nje−β0Wj−1−βWj−h0τj−1−hτj
(
xNj−1 − xNj) (e−yWk−1 − e−WBk)]
=
∑
j≥0
∑
k>j
R1jR2jR3jkR4k (2.38)
where
R1j = E
[
(α0αx)
Nj−1 e−(β0+β+y)Wj−1−(h0+h)τj−1
]
=
{
1, j = 0
γ0γ
j−1, j > 0
(2.39)
R2j = E
[
αXj
(
1− xXj) e−(β+y)Yj−h∆j] = {Γ 10 − Γ0, j = 0
Γ 1 − Γ, j > 0. (2.40)
We observe that the marginal distribution of Yi’s for i > µ (= j) can be different from Y1, . . . , Yµ,
because after a number of nodes in excess of M are purged at τµ, the forthcoming events (such
as further damage to the network leading to a sure excess of weight above V are so far limited to
those on the sub-σ-algebra F(Ω) ∩ {µ < ν}). The corresponding marginal transform of those Yi’s
can differ from γ in the next two equations. However, this will not alter the result of the summation
of R3jkR4k, as we will see. Without loss of generality we omit the corresponding formalism thus
having
R3jk = E
[
e−y(Yj+1+...+Yk−1)
]
= γk−1−j (1, y, 0) , k > j ≥ 0 (2.41)
R4k = E
[
1− e−yYk
]
= 1− γ (1, y, 0) , k > j ≥ 0 (2.42)
At this moment, we will suspend the proof to derive and state some results necessary to the
completion of the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.2. The norm
‖L [θ + λ− λg [zl (v)]]‖ = ‖γ (z, v, θ)‖ < 1 (2.43)
if
Re (θ) > 0, 1 > ‖z‖ , and Re (v) > 0 (2.44)
where any two of the inequalities can be weakened to ≥.
Proof. Consider
L (ϑ) = E
[
e−ϑ∆1
]
=
∫
v≥0
e−ϑvP∆1 (dv) (2.45)
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From (2.44)
‖L (ϑ)‖ ≤
∫
v≥0
∥∥e−ϑv∥∥P∆1 (dv) = ∫
v≥0
e−Re(ϑ)vP∆1 (dv)
≤
∫ 1
v=0
P∆1 (dv) + e
−Re(ϑ)
∫
v≥1
P∆1 (dv) = c+ (1− c) e−Re(ϑ) (2.46)
where c = P {∆1 ≤ 1}. If
c+ (1− c) e−Re(ϑ) < 1 (2.47)
then ‖L (ϑ)‖ < 1, so Re(ϑ) > 0 is sufficient for ‖L (ϑ)‖ < 1. Also, for ϑ = θ+λ−λg [zl (v)], we have
e−Re(ϑ) = e−Re(θ)e−λ[1−Re(g(zl(v)))] < 1 (2.48)
Inequality (2.47) holds if each of the two factors in (2.48) is less than one, or in the weaker form,
one of the factors equal to one and one is strictly less than one. Let us assume that each factor is
less than one. Then, we have Re(θ) > 0 and Re(g (zl (v))) < 1.
Since Re(g (zl (v))) ≤ ‖g (zl (v))‖, by imposing ‖g (zl (v))‖ < 1 we ensure that Re(g (zl (v))) < 1,
which is true by the Schwarz lemma below if ‖zl (v)‖ < 1, as follows.
Theorem 2.3 (Schwarz Lemma). Let g (z) be an analytic function inside the unit ball B (0, 1)
and satisfies the condition ‖g (z)‖ ≤ 1 and g (0) = 0. Then ‖g (z)‖ ≤ ‖z‖ and ‖g′ (0)‖ ≤ 1. If
‖f (z)‖ = ‖z‖ for some z 6= 0, then f (z) = cz,where c is a complex-valued constant of modulus 1.
Indeed, by the Schwarz lemma whose conditions are obviously met with g (0) = 0, ‖g (zl (v)) ‖ ≤
‖zl (v) ‖, and hence ‖g (zl (v))‖ < 1 if ‖zl (v)‖ < 1 holds. We first show that ‖l (v)‖ < 1 under the
condition that Re(v) > 0.
Proceeding with ‖l (v)‖ exactly as with L (ϑ) we impose Re(v) > 0 in order to have ‖l (v)‖ < 1.
Finally, ‖z‖ ≤ 1 is the common domain for a pgf like g (z). Imposing ‖z‖ < 1 we can relax Re(l (v))
to be ≥ 0 or Re(θ) ≥ 0.
Notice that upon application of operator Dpq of (2.15), the output variables must be restricted
to ‖·‖ < 1. Therefore, with Re(θ) ≥ 0, we have convergence. Also observe that Theorem 2.2 can be
applied to the norm of γ0 of (2.7) under minor modifications.
Now we continue with the proof of Theorem 2.1. Summing up
∑
k>j R3jkR4k yields 1 (with
||γ (1, y, 0) || < 1, under a minor sufficient condition given in Theorems 2.2 and 2.3). ∑j≥0R1jR2j
converges by the same argument, yielding
Ψ (x, y) = Γ 10 − Γ0 +
γ0
1− γ
(
Γ 1 − Γ ) . (2.49)
Applying the inverse operator D−1xy of (2.21) to Ψ (x, y) yields the statement of Theorem 2.1.
Proceeding as in Theorem 2.1, we can find the functionals Φµ=ν and Φµ>ν , using some additional
notation:
ζ = γ (αx, β, h) (2.50)
ζ0 = γ0 (αx, β, h) (2.51)
ζ1 = γ (α, β, h) (2.52)
ζ10 = γ0 (α, β, h) (2.53)
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Proposition 2.4. In light of abbreviations (2.22)-(2.27) and (2.50)-(2.53), the functional Φµ=ν of
the process on the trace σ-algebra F (Ω) ∩ {µ = ν} satisfies the following formula:
Φµ=ν =D
−1
xy
(
ζ10 − ζ0 − Γ 10 + Γ0 + γ01−γ
(
ζ1 − ζ − Γ 1 + Γ )) (M,V ) (2.54)
Proposition 2.5. In light of abbreviations (2.22)-(2.27) and (2.50)-(2.53), the functional Φµ>ν of
the process on the trace σ-algebra F (Ω) ∩ {µ > ν} satisfies the following formula:
Φµ>ν =D
−1
xy
(
ζ0 − Γ0 + γ01−γ (ζ − Γ )
)
(M,V ) (2.55)
By the linearity of the inverse operator and expectation, the previous 3 results yield the functional
of the process no longer confined to a particular ordering of the exit indices:
Corollary 2.6. In light of abbreviations (2.22)-(2.27) and (2.50)-(2.53)), the functional Φ of the
process on the σ-algebra F (Ω) satisfies the following formula:
Φ =D−1xy
(
ζ10 − Γ0 + γ01−γ
(
ζ1 − Γ )) (M,V ) (2.56)
Note that the basic model in this section, in a much more rudimentary form was proposed and
studied in Dshalalow [7] and further in Dshalalow and Liew [9].
3 An Auxiliary Threshold for the Discrete Component
Preliminaries. In this section we will analyze the process introduced in Section 2 more scrupu-
lously. We will add an intermediate control level M1 < M and incorporate it into the functional
Φµ<ν of (2.26). The information associated with the M1-threshold will become more conclusive on
what leads to critical threshold crossings of the network. The idea of an auxiliary threshold stems
from Dshalalow and Ke [8] applied there to stochastic games, with different utility and development
compared to the present paper.
We define the corresponding exit indices
µ1 = inf {j : Nj > M1} (3.1)
µ = inf {k : Nk > M} (3.2)
ν = inf {n : Wn > V } (3.3)
A realization of process X ⊗ Y ⊗ T (of losses defined in (2.9)) in Figure 1 illustrates how it
operates with respect to the introduced main and auxiliary thresholds. We can regard X ⊗ Y ⊗ T
as a two-dimensional random walk on a random grid (rather than traditional lattice). We have
a rectangular region formed of rectangular sectors in white, green, and red colors. In real-time a
“particle” tries to escape the white-green area at the first opportune time when the cumulative loss
of nodes exceeds M or the cumulative weight loss exceeds V , whichever comes first. It leaves a
polygonal path in blue and a cruder, observed, path ingreen. The particle enters the green area
indicating that a lower threshold M1 is crossed, while neither M nor V was. In reality, the green
area can be empty with a positive probability.
In the figure, the underlying real-time process (the blue dots) represents the real-time incoming
damages, which are observed only upon τk’s (depicted by the green dots), where the M1-observed-
crossing occurs before the first observed passage time (FOPT) of M or V (i.e. there is an observation
in the green area), at which the components of the process may or may not coincide with their values
at the real-time FPT.
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Here, the operator we will use contains an additional discrete transform Dq corresponding to the
M1 threshold.
Dpqs (·) (x, y, w) = (1− x) (1− y)w
∞∑
p=0
xp
∞∑
q=0
yq
∫ ∞
s=0
e−ws (·) ds (3.4)
where |x| < 1, |y| < 1,Re(w) > 0, i.e. Dpqs = LCs ◦Dq ◦Dp. Analogous to the operator in Section 2,
D−1xyw denotes the inverse of Dxyw.
The following result seems surprising. Unlike Section 2, with independent thresholds p and q for
two active components, now we have two of the three thresholds dependent (since M1 < M) and yet
the below lemma asserts that the application of operator Dpqs to the analogous indicator produces
the same result as the case with no relationship between variable levels p and q (representing M1
and M , respectively). This is a critical asset for our strategy of obtaining closed-form functionals.
Lemma 3.1 (M1-Level Insensitivity).
Dpqs
(
1{µ1(p,q)=j,µ(p,q)=k,ν(p,q,s)=n}1{j<k<n}
)
(x, y, w)
=
(
xNj−1 − xNj) (yNk−1 − yNk) (e−wWn−1 − e−wWn)1{j<k<n} (3.5)
Proof. Let
µ1 (p, q) := inf {j : Nj > p} (3.6)
µ (p, q) := inf {k : Nk > q} (3.7)
ν (p, q, s) := inf {n : Wn > s} (3.8)
We have
1{µ1(p,q)=j,µ(p,q)=k,ν(p,q,s)=n}
= 1{p<q}1{Nj−1≤p}1{Nj>p}1{Nk−1≤q}1{Nk>q}1{Wn−1≤s}1{Wn>s}1{j<k<n}
= 1{Nj−1≤p}1{Nj>p}
(
1{Nk>q} − 1{Nk−1>q}
)
1{Wn−1≤s}1{Wn>s}1{p<q}1{j<k<n}
Applying operator (3.4)) we have
Dpqs
(
1{µ1(p,q)=j,µ(p,q)=k,ν(p,q,s)=n}
)
(x, y, w)
= (1− x) (1− y)w
Nj−1∑
p=Nj−1
xp
Nk−1∑
q=Nk−1
yq
∫ Wn
s=Wn−1
e−wsds,
which readily yields the statement of the lemma.
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The extended functional,
Φµ1<µ<ν = Φµ1<µ<ν (u0, u, α0, α, v0, v, β0, β, θ0, θ, h0, h)
= E
[
u
Nµ1−1
0 u
Nµ1α
Nµ−1
0 α
Nµe−v0Wµ1−1−vWµ1−β0Wµ−1−βWµ
× e−θ0τµ1−1−θτµ1−h0τµ−1−hτµ1{µ1<µ<ν}
]
(3.9)
carries refined information about the cumulative damage upon crossing M1, as well as upon the
other reference times. Theorem 3.2 below will establish an explicit formula for Φµ1<µ<ν .
Having (2.7)-(2.8) in mind and replacing the abbreviations of Section 2, we denote
ϕ = γ (u0uα0αxy, v0 + v + β0 + β + w, θ0 + θ + h0 + h) (3.10)
ϕ0 = γ0 (u0uα0αxy, v0 + v + β0 + β + w, θ0 + θ + h0 + h) (3.11)
φ = γ (uα0αxy, v + β0 + β + w, θ + h0 + h) (3.12)
φ0 = γ0 (uα0αxy, v + β0 + β + w, θ + h0 + h) (3.13)
φ1 = γ (uα0αy, v + β0 + β + w, θ + h0 + h) (3.14)
φ10 = γ0 (uα0αy, v + β0 + β + w, θ + h0 + h) (3.15)
ψ = γ (α0αy, β0 + β + w, h0 + h) (3.16)
χ = γ (αy, β + w, h) (3.17)
χ1 = γ (α, β + w, h) (3.18)
ξ = γ (αy, β, h) (3.19)
ξ1 = γ (α, β, h) (3.20)
Theorem 3.2. The functional Φµ1<µ<ν of the of the network damage on the trace σ-algebra F (Ω)∩
{µ1 < µ < ν} satisfies the following formula under notation (3.10)-(3.20):
Φµ1<µ<ν =D
−1
xyw
([
φ10 − φ0 + ϕ01−ϕ (φ1 − φ)
]
χ1−χ
1−ψ
)
(M1,M, V ) (3.21)
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we will apply an analog of the LCD operator (3.4) to{
1{µ1(p,q)=j,µ(p,q)=k,ν(p,q,s)=n} : (p, q) ∈ N, s ∈ R+
}
(3.22)
The functional Φµ1<µ<ν becomes
Φµ1(p,q)<µ(p,q)<ν(p,q,s)
= E
[
u
Nµ1(p,q)−1
0 u
Nµ1(p.q)α
Nµ(p,q)−1
0 α
Nµ(p,q)e−v0Wµ1(p,q)−1−vWµ1(p,q)
× e−β0Wµ(p,q)−1−βWµ(p,q)−θ0τµ1(p,q)−1−θτµ1(p,q)−h0τµ(p,q)−1−hτµ(p,q)
= E
[
u
Nµ1(p,q)−1
0 u
Nµ1(p.q)α
Nµ(p,q)−1
0 α
Nµ(p.q)e−v0Wµ1(p,q)−1−vWµ1(p,q)
× 1{µ1(p,q)<µ(p,q)<ν(p,q,s)}
]
(3.23)
with
Φµ1<µ<ν = Φµ1(M1,M)<µ(M1,M)<ν(M1,M,V ) (3.24)
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We first arrive at
Dpqs
(
1{µ1(p,q)=j,µ(p,q)=k,ν(p,q,s)=n}1{j<k<n}
)
(x, y, w)
=
(
xNj−1 − xNj) (yNk−1 − yNk) (e−wWn−1 − e−wWn)1{j<k<n}
as per Lemma 3.1. Denote
Ψ (x, y, w) :=Dpqs
(
Φµ1(p,q)<µ(p,q)<ν(p,q,s)
)
(x, y, w) . (3.25)
Analogous to the proof in Theorem 2.1, we have
Ψ (x, y, w) =
∑
j≥0
∑
k>j
∑
n>k
E
[
u
Nj−1
0 u
Njα
Nk−1
0 α
Nke−v0Wj−1−vWj−β0Wk−1−βWk
× e−v0Wj−1−vWj−β0Wk−1−βWk−θ0τj−1−θτj−h0τk−1−hτk
× (xNj−1 − xNj) (yNk−1 − yNk) (e−wWn−1 − e−wWn)]
=
∑
j≥0
∑
k>j
∑
n>k
R1jR2jR3jkR4kR5kn (3.26)
where
R1j = E
[
(u0uα0αxy)
Nj−1 e−(v0+v+β0+β+w)Wj−1−(θ0+θ+h0+h)τj−1
]
=
{
1, j = 0
ϕ0ϕ
j−1, j > 0
(3.27)
R2j = E
[
(uα0αy)
Xj
(
1− xXj) e−(v+β0+β+w)Yj−(θ+h0+h)∆j]
=
{
φ10 − φ0, j = 0
φ1 − φ, j > 0 (3.28)
R3jk = E
[
(α0αy)
Xj+1+...+Xk−1 e−(β0+β+w)(Yj+1+...+Yk−1)e−(h0+h)(∆j+1+...+∆k−1)
]
= ψk−1−j , k > j ≥ 0 (3.29)
R4k = E
[
αXk
(
1− yXk) e−(β+w)Yk−h∆k] = χ1 − χ (3.30)
R5kn = E
[
e−w(Yk+1+...+Yn−1)
]
E
[
1− e−wYn]
= γn−1−k (1, w, 0) (1− γ (1, w, 0)) , n > k (3.31)
Using Theorem 2.2,
∑
n>k
R5kn = 1. The other summations converge similarly, so
Ψ (x, y, z) =
[
φ10 − φ0 +
ϕ0
1− ϕ
(
φ1 − φ)]χ1 − χ
1− ψ (3.32)
The assertion of the theorem follows upon application of operator D−1xyw to (3.32).
The Complete Auxiliary Functional. The formula proved in Theorem 3.2 is itself useful.
However, we are further interested in information on the process restricted to the case where the
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first observed crossing of M1 precedes the first observed crossing of M or V , whichever comes first:
i.e. a functional restricted to {µ1 < min {µ, ν}}:
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (u0, u, α0, α, v0, v, β0, β, θ0, θ, h0, h)
= E
[
u
Nµ1−1
0 u
Nµ1α
Nmin{µ,ν}−1
0 α
Nmin{µ,ν}e−v0Wµ1−1−vWµ1−β0Wmin{µ,ν}−1−βWmin{µ,ν}
× e−θ0τµ1−1−θτµ1−h0τmin{µ,ν}−1−hτmin{µ,ν}1{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
= Φµ1<µ<ν + Φµ1<µ=ν + Φµ1<ν<µ (3.33)
We derived the first functional in Theorem 3.2, and we find the others in the following two results
whose proofs are analogous to Theorem 3.2.
Proposition 3.3. The functional Φµ1<µ=ν of the of the network damage on the trace σ-algebra
F (Ω) ∩ {µ1 < µ = ν} satisfies the following formula under notation (3.10)-(3.20):
Φµ1<µ=ν =D
−1
xyw
([
φ10 − φ0 + ϕ01−ϕ
(
φ1 − φ)] ξ1−ξ+χ−χ11−ψ ) (M1,M, V ) . (3.34)
Proposition 3.4. The functional Φµ1<ν<µ of the of the network damage on the trace σ-algebra
F (Ω) ∩ {µ1 < ν < µ} satisfies the following formula under notation (3.10)-(3.20):
Φµ1<ν<µ =D
−1
xyw
([
φ10 − φ0 + ϕ01−ϕ
(
φ1 − φ)] ξ−χ1−ψ) (M1,M, V ) . (3.35)
Combining results 3.2-3.4, by linearity we can add them for the general functional.
Theorem 3.5. The functional Φµ1<min{µ,ν} of the of the network damage on the trace σ-algebra
F (Ω) ∩ {µ1 < min {µ, ν}} satisfies the following formula under (3.10)-(3.20):
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} =D
−1
xyw
([
φ10 − φ0 + ϕ01−ϕ (φ1 − φ)
]
ξ1−χ
1−ψ
)
(M1,M, V ) . (3.36)
In the next two sections, we will demonstrate analytical and numerical tractability of results
derived by this approach by carrying out the inverse operators for several practical special cases.
We begin with Model 1 in which the status of the network is updated upon a deterministic process,
which is a reasonable assumption for many practical cases where periodic measurements are taken, as
opposed to Model 2 of Section 5 in which the information about the network is collected upon random
times in accordance with a specified Poisson point process (thus, with exponentially distributed
inter-observation times). These two cases together represent most common types of statistical data
collection.
There are other differences between the two models. In Model 1 (with “constant observations”)
we assume that the number of nodes stricken in a single attack is limited by a finite number R, with
no further restriction upon its distribution. The associated weight of a stricken node is assumed
to be gamma distributed. In Model 2 (with “exponential observations”), the number of nodes
stricken in one attack is geometrically distributed, whereas the weight associated with each node is
exponentially distributed. It seems as though the assumptions made in Model 1 are more challenging
than those in Model 2, although they are rather different.
4 Model 1. Constant Observations
In this section, we will present fully explicit probabilistic results for a special case of the process
with the M1-auxiliary threshold (Model 1), under the following assumptions.
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1. As previously, the attack times {t1, t2, ...} form a Poisson point process of rate λ.
2. Inter-observation times are constant, that is, ∆k = τk − τk−1 = c a.s., L (z) = e−zc.
3. Nodes lost per strike have an arbitrary finite discrete distribution, i.e.
P{nk = j} = pj , j = 1, ..., R, g (z) =
R∑
s=1
psz
s, with p = (p1, ..., pR).
4. Weight per node wjk ∈ [Gamma (α, ξ)], l (z) =
(
ξ
z+ξ
)α
.
5. The initial functional γ0 = 1 (i.e. zero initial damage).
We note that deterministic observations always present a more challenging case in the context of
a stochastic system than random observations. Furthermore, we restrict the total number of nodes
destroyed in a single strike by a finite number R, which of course can be made arbitrarily large,
thereby imposing literally no restriction on the distribution of perished nodes. The general gamma
distribution of weight of a single node is also very general. Yet, as we will see, the main indicator of
the network status will be established in a closed form functional.
To find marginal transforms we use the γ-functional of the increment of the process upon obser-
vations (as per Lemma A.1),
γ (z, v, θ) = L [θ + λ− λg (zl (v))] (4.1)
By Theorem 3.5 and due to Assumption 5,
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} =D
−1
xyw
(
φ1−φ
1−ϕ
ξ1−χ
1−ψ
)
(M1,M, V ) (4.2)
Furthermore,
Theorem 4.1. Under Assumptions 1-5, the joint transform of the number of lost nodes, their
cumulative weight, and the first passage time of the crossing of M1 preceding the first crossing of M
or V (i.e. on the trace σ-algebra F (Ω) ∩ {µ1 < min {µ, ν}}) satisfies the following formula:
E
[
uNµ1 e−vWµ1 e−θτµ11{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
= e−c(θ+λ)
{
M1−1∑
k=0
ukFk (θ,p)
M−1−k∑
m=0
umEm (p)
(
ξ
v + ξ
)α(k+m)
P (α (k +m) , (v + ξ)V )
−
M1−1∑
k=0
uk
(
ξ
ξ + v
)αk
P (αk, (v + ξ)V )
k∑
n=0
En (p)Fk−n (θ,p)
}
, (4.3)
where
Fj (θ,p) =
bR−1R jc∑
r=0
(cλ)
j−r
Li−(j−r)
(
e−c(θ+λ)
) ∑
‖β‖1=j
[R]·β=r+j
p
β1
1 ···p
βR
R
β1! ··· βR! , (4.4)
[R] = (1, ..., R) , β = (β1, ..., βR) ∈ NR0 (βj ≤ R,for each j), (4.5)
Lis (z) =
∞∑
k=1
zkk−s is the polylogarithm, which is numerically tractable for our
domain {e−w : Re (w) > 0} with s ∈ Z≤0,
Ej (p) =
bR−1R jc∑
r=0
(cλ)
j−r ∑
‖β‖1=j
[R]·β=r+j
pβ11 · · · pβRR
β1! · · · βR! (4.6)
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P (x, y) = 1− Γ(x,y)Γ(x) is the upper regularized gamma function,
Γ (x, y) is the incomplete gamma function, and Γ (x) is the gamma function.
Proof. By (4.2),
E
[
uNµ1 e−vWµ1 e−θτµ11{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
= Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (1, u, 1, 1, 0, v, 0, 0, 0, θ, 0, 0) = D
−1
xyw
(
φ1 − φ
1− ϕ
ξ1 − χ
1− ψ
)
(M1,M, V )
where
φ1 − φ
1− ϕ =
γ (uy, v + w, θ)− γ (uxy, v + w, θ)
1− γ (uxy, v + w, θ) = A−B, (4.7)
A :=
e−cθy
1− e−cθxy , (4.8)
B :=
e−cθxy
1− e−cθxy , (4.9)
ξ1 − χ
1− ψ =
γ (1, 0, 0)− γ (y, w, 0)
1− γ (y, w, 0) =
1− γ (y, w, 0)
1− γ (y, w, 0) = 1, (4.10)
θy = θ + λ− λ
R∑
s=1
ps (uly)
s
, θxy = θ + λ− λ
R∑
s=1
ps (ulyx)
s
, l = l (v + w) (4.11)
Re(cθxy) > 0, so
∣∣e−cθxy ∣∣ < 1, so we can find
1
1− e−cθxy =
∑
i≥0
e−cθxyi =
∑
i≥0
e−c(θ+λ)i
∑
j≥0
(cλi)
j
j!
(
R∑
s=1
ps (ulyx)
s
)j
=
∑
j≥0
(cλ)
j
j!
∑
i≥0
ije−c(θ+λ)i
( R∑
k=1
pk (ulyx)
k
)j
.
By the multinomial theorem,
=
∑
j≥0
(cλu)
j
j!
∑
i≥0
ije−c(θ+λ)i
 j(R−1)∑
k=0
ukCjk (p) (lyx)
k+j
,
where Cjk (p) =
∑
‖β‖1=j
[R]·β=k+j
(
j
β1 ··· βR
)
pβ11 · · · pβRR
Returning to (4.8),
A = e−cθy
∑
j≥0
ujAj (θ)
j(R−1)∑
k=0
ukCjk (p) (lyx)
j+k
,
where Ak (θ) =
(cλ)k
k!
∑
i≥0
ike−c(θ+λ)i.
A = e−cθy
∑
j≥0
j(R−1)∑
k=0
ujAj (θ)u
kCjk (p) (lyx)
j+k
.
For convenience, we denote this
A = e−cθy
∑
j≥0
j(R−1)∑
k=0
Djk (lyx)
j+k
= e−cθy
∑
j≥0
 ∑
m+r=j
r≤m(R−1)
Dmr
 (lyx)j . (4.12)
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Note that
∑
m+r=j
r≤m(R−1)
Dmr =
∑
r≤(j−r)(R−1)
Dj−r,r =
bR−1R jc∑
r=0
Dj−r,r (4.13)
Combining (4.12)-(4.13), we find
A = e−cθy
∑
j≥0
uj
 b
R−1
R jc∑
r=0
Aj−r (θ)Cj−r,r (p)
 (lyx)j
= e−cθy
∑
j≥0
ujFj (θ,p) (lyx)
j
(4.14)
Applying DM1−1x to (4.14) and using properties (i, iv) of the inverse operator given in Appendix B,
we get
e−cθy
M1−1∑
j=0
ujFj (θ,p) (ly)
j
(4.15)
ApplyingDM−1y to (4.15) with properties (i, iii, iv), we have (showing only main transitions),
M1−1∑
j=0
ujFj (θ,p) l
jDM−1y
(
yje−cθy
)
= e−c(θ+λ)
M1−1∑
j=0
ujFj (θ,p) l
jDM−1−jy
ecλ R∑s=1 ps(uly)s

= e−c(θ+λ)
M1−1∑
j=0
ujFj (θ,p) l
jDM−1−jy
∑
k≥0
ukEk (p) (ly)
k

= e−c(θ+λ)
M1−1∑
j=0
ujFj (θ,p)
M−1−j∑
k=0
ukEk (p) l
k+j (4.16)
Next, applying L−1w
(
1
w ·
)
(V ) to (4.16),
= e−c(θ+λ)
M1−1∑
j=0
ujFj (θ,p)
M−1−j∑
k=0
ukEk (p)
(
ξ
v + ξ
)α(j+k)
P (α (j + k) , (v + ξ)V ) . (4.17)
Returning to (4.9), we apply the same procedure to B,
B = e−cθxy
∑
j≥0
ujFj (θ,p) (lyx)
j
= e−c(θ+λ)
∑
k≥0
ukEk (p) (lyx)
k
∑
j≥0
ujFj (θ,p) (lyx)
j

= e−c(θ+λ)
∑
n≥0
un
[
n∑
k=0
Ek (p)Fn−k (θ,p)
]
(lyx)
n
. (4.18)
Applying DM1−1x and DM−1y to (4.18), we get
e−c(θ+λ)
M1−1∑
n=0
un
[
n∑
k=0
Ek (p)Fn−k (θ,p)
]
ln. (4.19)
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Applying L−1w
(
1
w ·
)
(V ) to (4.19) yields
e−c(θ+λ)
M1−1∑
n=0
un
[
n∑
k=0
Ek (p)Fn−k (θ,p)
](
ξ
ξ + v
)αn
P (αn, (v + ξ)V ) (4.20)
Subtracting (4.20) from (4.17) yields the desired result.
Remark 4.2. Through simulation of the process, we were able to produce some verification of the re-
sults via numerical examples. For two sets of parameters of the process withR = 3 (λ, [p1, p2, p3], [α, ξ], c,M1,M, V ),
we generated 100 realizations of the process for each of a range of M1 values and calculated the em-
pirical probabilities P {µ1 < min {µ, ν}} for each:
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5 Model 2. Exponential Observations
In this section, we will offer fully explicit formulas for another special case of the process with
the M1-auxiliary threshold (Model 2), under the following assumptions.
1. The attack times {t1, t2, ...} form a Poisson point process of rate λ
2. Inter-observation times ∆k = τk − τk−1 ∈ [Exponential(µ)], so L (z) = µµ+z .
3. Nodes losses per strike nk ∈ [Geometric(a)] (with b = 1− a), so g (z) = az1−bz
4. Weight lost per node wjk ∈ [Exponential(ξ)], so l (z) = ξξ+z
5. The initial functional γ0 = 1 (i.e. zero initial damage)
Using these, we find explicit marginal transforms. As in Section 4, we use the functional of the
increment of the process upon observations (as shown in Lemma A.1),
γ (z, v, θ) = L [θ + λ− λg (zl (v))] . (5.1)
By Theorem 3.5 and Assumption 5,
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (u0, u, α0, α, v0, v, β0, β, θ0, θ, h0, h) =D
−1
xyw
(
φ1−φ
1−ϕ
ξ1−χ
1−ψ
)
(M1,M, V ) . (5.2)
5.1 The Joint Transform upon τµ1
We will find the joint transform of the process upon the observed M1-crossing and deduce some
useful results from it, i.e.
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (1, u, 1, 1, 0, v, 0, 0, 0, θ, 0, 0) = E
[
uNµ1 e−vWµ1 e−θτµ11{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
(5.3)
We introduce some notation convenient for the forthcoming results
kj (v) = e
−(v+ξ)V
j∑
i=0
[(v + ξ)V ]
i
i!
= 1− P (j + 1, (v + ξ)V ) , j ≥ 0, (5.4)
rjk (u, v, θ) = e
−(v+ξ)V
j∑
i=k
[ξd (θ)uV ]
i
i!
= e−(v+ξ(1−d(θ)u))V [P (k, ξd (θ)uV )− P (j + 1, ξd (θ)uV )] (5.5)
c (θ) =
λ+ bθ
λ+ θ
, d (θ) =
λ+ b (µ+ θ)
λ+ µ+ θ
(5.6)
We will also use the convention
−1∑
j=0
= 1.
Proposition 5.1. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)-(5.6), for M1 > M1 + 1,
E
[
uNµ1 e−vWµ1 e−θτµ11{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
aλµ [c (θ)]
M1−1 (uξ)M1
(µ+ θ + λ) (θ + λ) (v + ξ (1− d (θ)))
×
[
P (M1 − 1, (v + ξ)V )
(v + ξ)
M1−1 −
rM−2M1−1 (u, v, θ)
(d (θ)uξ)
M1−1 −
(d (θ)uξ)
M−M1 P (M − 1, (v + ξ)V )
(v + ξ)
M−1
]
(5.7)
For M = M1 + 1,
E
[
uNµ1 e−vWµ1 e−θτµ11{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
aλµ [c (θ)]
M1−1 (uξ)M1
(µ+ θ + λ) (θ + λ) (v + ξ)
M1
P (M1, (v + ξ)V ) (5.8)
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Proof. By (5.2),
E
[
uNµ1 e−vWµ1 e−θτµ11{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
= Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (1, u, 1, 1, 0, v, 0, 0, 0, θ, 0, 0) = D
−1
xyw
(
φ1 − φ
1− ϕ
ξ1 − χ
1− ψ
)
(M1,M, V ) .
After inputting parameters and using (5.4)-(5.6), we have
φ1 − φ
1− ϕ =
γ (uy, v + w, θ)− γ (uxy, v + w, θ)
1− γ (uxy, v + w, θ) =
µ
µ+ θy
θxy − θy
θxy
,
ξ1 − χ
1− ψ = 1, (5.9)
where
θy = θ + λ− λg (uly) , θxy = θ + λ− λg (ulyx) , l = l (v + w) (5.10)
Then DM1−1x
(
µ
µ+θy
θxy−θy
θxy
)
= µµ+θyDM1−1x
(
θxy−θy
θxy
)
, where
θxy − θy
θxy
=
θ + λ− λ aulyx1−bulyx − θ − λ+ λ auly1−buly
θ + λ− λ aulyx1−bulyx
=
λauly
(θ + λ) (1− buly)
1− x
1− culyx . (5.11)
For convenience, denote c = c (θ) , d = d (θ). Now we apply DM1−1x to (5.11), using properties (i, iii,
v) from Appendix B, and retain the multiplier to the left, resulting in
µ
µ+ θy
λa (uly)
M1 cM1−1
(θ + λ) (1− buly) (5.12)
Next, we need to apply DM−1y to (5.12), so we first expand the µµ+θy term,
µ
µ+ θy
λa (uly)
M1 cM1−1
(θ + λ) (1− buly) =
aµλ (ul)
M1 cM1−1
(θ + λ) (µ+ θ + λ)
yM1
1− duly (5.13)
This allows us to apply DM−1y to (5.12), via properties (i, iii, iv) of the inverse operator given in
Appendix B:
DM−1y
(
yM1
1− duly
)
= DM−M1−1y
(
1
1− duly
)
=
1− (du)M−M1 lM−M1
1− dul (5.14)
Next, we need to apply LC−1w (·) (V ) to the results of (5.13)-(5.14), for M > M1 + 1:
aµλcM1−1uM1
(θ + λ) (µ+ θ + λ)
LC−1w
(
lM1
1− (du)M−M1 lM−M1
1− dul
)
(V ) . (5.15)
A more convenient form is as follows:
lM1
1− (du)M−M1 lM−M1
1− dul =
(
ξ
v + w + ξ
)M1 1− (du)M−M1 ( ξv+w+ξ)M−M1
1− du
(
ξ
v+w+ξ
)
= ξM1
[
A− (duξ)M−M1 B
]
.
Next, we will apply LC−1w (·) = L−1w
(
1
w ·
)
to both A and B. By partial fractions,
LC−1w (A) (V ) =
1
v + ξ (1− du)
[
L−1w
(
1
w (w + v + ξ)
M1−1
)
(V )
− L−1w
(
1
(w + v + ξ (1− du)) (w + v + ξ)M1−1
)
(V )
]
19
=
1
v + ξ (1− du)
[
1− kM1−2 (v)
(v + ξ)
M1−1 −
e−(v+ξ(1−du))V
(duξ)
M1−1
1− e−ξduV M1−2∑
j=0
(ξduV )
j
j!
]. (5.16)
The inverse transform of B is similar, where M1 is replaced by M . Combining this inverse with
(5.16) yields the statement of the theorem for M > M1 + 1.
For M = M1 + 1, the inverse Laplace-Carson transform reduces to
LC−1w
(
lM1
)
(V ) = L−1w
(
ξM1−1
w(w+v+ξ)M1−1
)
(V ) =
(
ξ
v+ξ
)M1−1
[1− kM1−2 (v)]
The first fact we deduce from the joint transform above is the probability that the observed M1
crossing occurs before crossing of an observed M or V .
Corollary 5.2. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)-(5.6) for M > M1 + 1,
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) = E
[
1{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
= P {µ1 < min {µ, ν}}
= P (M1 − 1, ξV )−
rM−2M1−1 (1, 0, 0)
d (0)
M1−1 − d (0)
M−M1 P (M − 1, ξV ) . (5.17)
Remark 5.3. Through simulation of the process, we were able to produce some verification of the
results via numerical examples. For two sets of parameters of the process (λ, a, ξ, µ,M1,M, V ), we
generated 100 realizations of the process for each of a range of M1 values and calculated the empirical
probabilities of P {µ1 < min {µ, ν}} for each:
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5.2 Marginal Transforms upon τµ1
In this subsection, we present the joint transform and marginal transforms of each component of
the process upon the (intermediate) control level M1 crossing. These follow trivially from the joint
functional of the previous subsection by adjusting the values of u, v, and θ.
Corollary 5.4. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)-(5.6) for M > M1 + 1,
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (1, u, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) = E
[
uNµ11{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
aµuM1
(µ+ λ) (1− d (0)u)
[
P (M1 − 1, ξV )−
rM−2M1−1 (u, 0, 0)
(d (0)u)
M1−1 − (d (0)u)
M−M1 P (M − 1, ξV )
]
. (5.18)
Corollary 5.5. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)(5.6), for M > M1 + 1,
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, v, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) = E
[
e−vWµ11{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
aµ
µ+ λ
ξM1
v + ξ (1− d (0))
[
P (M1 − 1, (ξ + v)V )
(v + ξ)
M1−1 −
rM−2M1−1 (1, v, 0)
(d (0) ξ)
M1−1
− (d (0) ξ)
M−M1 P (M − 1, (ξ + v)V )
(v + ξ)
M−1
]
. (5.19)
Corollary 5.6. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)-(5.6), for M > M1 + 1,
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, θ, 0, 0) = E
[
e−θτµ11{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
aµλc (θ)
M1−1
(θ + λ) (µ+ θ + λ) (1− d (θ))
×
[
P (M1 − 1, ξV )−
rM−2M1−1 (1, 0, θ)
d (θ)
M−M1 − d (θ)
M−M1 P (M − 1, ξV )
]
. (5.20)
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5.3 The Joint Transform upon τmin{µ,ν}
In this subsection, we will find the joint transform of the process upon the first observed crossing of
M or V . By (5.2), the desired transform is
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (1, 1, 1, α, 0, 0, 0, β, 0, 0, 0, h)
= E
[
αNmin{µ,ν}e−βWmin{µ,ν}e−hτmin{µ,ν}1{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
. (5.21)
We will use the following additional notation,
s (x, y) =
M−M1−1∑
i=1
(
c (x)
d (y)
)i
(5.22)
Proposition 5.7. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)-(5.6) and (5.22), for M > M1 + 1,
E
[
αNmin{µ,ν}e−βWmin{µ,ν}e−hτmin{µ,ν}1{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
(aµλ)
2
αM1+1ξM1c (h)
M1−1
(1− d (h)αl (β)) (h+ λ)2 (µ+ h+ λ)2
1
β + ξ (1− d (h)α)
×
{
l (β)
[
P (M1 − 1, (β + ξ)V )
(β + ξ)
M1−1 −
e−(β+ξ(1−d(h)α))V − rM1−20 (α, β, h)
(d (h)αξ)
M1−1
]
+
(
l (β)− 1
αc
)M−M1−1∑
j=1
(c (h)αξ)
j
×
[
P (M1 + j − 1, (β + ξ)V )
(β + ξ)
M1+j−1 −
e−(β+ξ(1−d(h)α))V − rM1+j−20 (α, β, h)
(d (h)αξ)
M1+j−1
]
− (d (h)αξ)M−M1
[
l (β) +
(
l (β)− 1
αc (h)
)
s (h, h)
]
×
[
P (M − 1, (β + ξ)V )
(β + ξ)
M−1 −
e−(β+ξ(1−d(h)α))V − rM−20 (α, β, h)
(d (h)αξ)
M−1
]}
. (5.23)
Proof. The following term is independent of x.
ξ1 − χ
1− ψ =
γ (α,w, h)− γ (αy,w + β, h)
1− γ (αy,w + β, h) =
µ
µ+ h∗
hy − h∗
hy
, (5.24)
hy = h+ λ− λ aαly
1− bαly , h∗ = h+ λ− λ
aαl (β)
1− bαl (β) , l = l (w + β) , (5.25)
so as in (5.11)-(5.14) with (u, v, θ) replaced with (α, β, h), we apply DM1−1x to φ
1−φ
1−ϕ while denoting
c = c (h) , d = d (h) for convenience,
DM1−1x
(
φ1 − φ
1− ϕ
)
=
µ
µ+ hy
aλ (αl)
M1 cM1−1
h+ λ
yM1
1− bαly . (5.26)
Manipulating µµ+hy ,
hy−h∗
hy
, and µµ+h∗ similarly and combining with the above yields
ξ1 − χ
1− ψ D
M1−1
x
(
φ1 − φ
1− ϕ
)
= ClM1
yM1 (l (β)− ly)
(1− cαly) (1− dαly) (5.27)
where C = (aµλ)
2αM1+1cM1−1
(1−dαl(β))(h+λ)2(µ+h+λ)2 . We can now apply DM−1y to (5.27), using properties (i, iii, vi)
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of the inverse operator as given in Appendix B,
ClM1DM−1y
(
l (β) yM1 − lyM1+1
(1− cαly) (1− dαly)
)
= Cl (β)
lM1
1− dαl + C
(
l (β)− 1
αc
)M−M1−1∑
j=1
(cα)
j l
M1+j
1− dαl
− C (dα)M−M1
[
l (β) +
(
l (β)− 1
αc
)
s (h, h)
]
lM
1− dαl . (5.28)
Next, we need to apply LC−1w (·) (V ) to (5.28). Notice that each non-constant term (with respect to
w) is of the form l
k
1−dαl , so we establish a result for an arbitrary k. We have
1
w
· l
k
1− dαl =
ξk
w (w + β + ξ)
k−1
(w + β + ξ (1− dα))
.
Applying LC−1w here is the same as in (5.16) with M1 = k, v = β, and θ = h, so we have
L−1w
(
1
w
lk
1− dαl
)
(V ) =
ξk
β + ξ (1− dα)
×
[
1− kk−2 (β)
(β + ξ)
k−1 −
e−(β+ξ(1−d(h)α))V − rk−20 (α, β, h)
(dαξ)
k−1
]
. (5.29)
Applying this result to (5.28) and expanding the constant C yields the statement of the theorem
for M > M1 + 1. Deriving a formula for M = M1 + 1 is similar to the second part of the proof of
Proposition 5.1, where applying DM1y instead yields a constant, l (β) in (5.28).
5.4 Marginal Transforms upon τmin{µ,ν}
Next, we find the marginal transforms of each component upon τmin{µ,ν}, the first observed crossing
of M or V . These readily follow from the joint functional of the previous section by adjusting the
values of α, β, and h.
Corollary 5.8. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)-(5.6) and (5.22),
E
[
αNmin{µ,ν}1{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
(aµ)
2
αM1+1
(1− d (0)α)2 (µ+ h+ λ)2
{
P (M1 − 1, ξV )− e
−ξ(1−d(0)α)V − rM1−20 (α, 0, 0)
(d (0)α)
M1−1
+
α− 1
α
M−M1−1∑
j=1
αj
[
P (M1 + j − 1, ξV )− e
−ξ(1−d(h)α)V − rM1+j−20 (α, 0, 0)
(d (0)α)
M1+j−1
]
− (d (0)αξ)M−M1
[
1 +
(
α− 1
α
)
s (0, 0)
]
×
[
P (M − 1, ξV )− e
−ξ(1−d(0)α)V − rM−20 (α, 0, 0)
(d (0)α)
M−1
]}
. (5.30)
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Corollary 5.9. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)-(5.6) and (5.22),
E
[
e−βWmin{µ,ν}1{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
(aµ)
2
ξM1
(1− d (0) l (β)) (µ+ λ)2
1
β + ξ (1− d (0))
×
{
l (β)
[
P (M1 − 1, (β + ξ)V )
(β + ξ)
M1−1 −
e−(β+ξ(1−d(h)))V − rM1−20 (1, β, 0)
(d (0) ξ)
M1−1
]
+ (l (β)− 1)
M−M1−1∑
j=1
ξj
[
P (M1 + j − 1, (β + ξ)V )
(β + ξ)
M1+j−1 −
e−(β+ξ(1−d(0)))V − rM1+j−20 (1, β, 0)
(d (0) ξ)
M1+j−1
]
− (d (0) ξ)M−M1 [l (β) + (l (β)− 1) s (0, 0)]
×
[
P (M − 1, (β + ξ)V )
(β + ξ)
M−1 −
e−(β+ξ(1−d(h)))V − rM−20 (1, 0, 0)
(d (h) ξ)
M−1
]}
. (5.31)
Corollary 5.10. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)-(5.6) and (5.22),
E
[
e−hτmin{µ,ν}1{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
(aµλ)
2
c (h)
M1−1
(1− d (h))2 (h+ λ)2 (µ+ h+ λ)2
{[
P (M1 − 1, ξV )− e
−ξ(1−d(h))V − rM1−20 (1, 0, h)
d (h)
M1−1
]
+
c (h)− 1
c (h)
M−M1−1∑
j=1
c (h)
j
[
1− P (M1 + j − 1, ξV )− e
−ξ(1−d(h))V − rM1+j−20 (1, 0, h)
d (h)
M1+j−1
]
− d (h)M−M1
[
1 +
(
c (h)− 1
c (h)
)
s (h, h)
]
×
[
P (M − 1, ξV )− e
−ξ(1−d(h))V − rM−20 (1, 0, h)
d (h)
M−1
]}
. (5.32)
5.5 Time Between Successive Threshold Crossings
Next, we provide a functional of the time between the observed M1 crossing and the first observed
M or V crossing,
Φµ1<min{µ,ν} (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−h, 0, h) = E
[
e−h(τmin{µ,ν}−τµ1)1{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
. (5.33)
Proposition 5.11. Under Assumptions 1-5 and notation (5.4)-(5.6) and (5.22),
E
[
e−h(τmin{µ,ν}−τµ1)1{µ1<min{µ,ν}}
]
=
aµ2λ
(µ+ λ) (µ+ h) (h+ λ) (1− d (0))
{[
P (M1 − 1, ξV )− e
−ξ(1−d(0))V − rM1−20 (1, 0, 0)
d (0)
M1−1
]
+
c (h)− 1
c (h)
M−M1−1∑
j=1
c (h)
j
[
P (M1 + j − 1, ξV )− e
−ξ(1−d(0))V − rM1+j−20 (1, 0, 0)
d (0)
M1+j−1
]
− d (0)M−M1
(
1 +
c (h)− 1
c (h)
s (h, 0)
)
×
[
P (M − 1, ξV )− e
−ξ(1−d(0))V − rM−20 (1, 0, 0)
d (0)
M−1
]}
. (5.34)
The proof is similar to the above propositions and thus is omitted.
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5.6 Summary
In this article we deal with the detection and prediction of losses due to cyber attacks waged on
large-scale vital networks. We model the accumulation of losses to a network during a series of hostile
attacks by a 2-dimensional monotone random walk process as observed by an independent delayed
renewal process. The first component of the process is associated with the number of nodes (such as
routers or operational sites) incapacitated by successive attacks. Each node has a weight associated
with its incapacitation (such as loss of operational capacity or financial expense associated with
repair), and the second component represents the cumulative weight associated with the nodes lost.
Each component has a fixed threshold, and crossing of a threshold by either component represents
the network entering a critical condition. We obtain tractable results in the form of joint transforms
of the predicted time of the first observed threshold crossing, along with the values of each underlying
component (such as the number of perished nodes, their associated cumulative weight) upon this
time and one observation prior to the first passage time. We demonstrated the tractability of the
obtained results on two major and various other special cases. We further validated the results
through the comparison with stochastically simulated attacks.
5.7 A Forthcoming and Future Work.
We continue our research on strategic networks in two directions. First, we plan to further refine the
obtained predicted data hindered by an eventual crudeness of observations. This will be rendered by
means of so-called “time sensitive analysis.” The latter is a completely different technique applied
to continuous time parameter processes and it will allow us to obtain the underlying distributions in
any vicinity of the first passage time reviving missed moments of attacks due to delayed observations.
These measures may yield a more accurate information about the status of the network than those
delivered by auxiliary thresholds. The method of auxiliary thresholds will thus be replaced by the
time sensitive analysis, although a combination of both techniques is not excluded. Independent of
this refinement, we also plan to introduce strategic defense of finite networks, which can be utilized
to random walks on smaller scale graphs.
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Appendices
A Proof of the Value of γ(z, v, θ)
Lemma A.1. The joint functional of increments per observation epoch is
γ (z, v, θ) = L [θ + λ− λg (zl (v))] (A.1)
Proof.
γ (z, v, θ) = E
[
zX1e−vY1e−θ∆1
]
= E
[
e−θ∆1E
[
zX1e−vY1
∣∣∣∆1]]
= E
[
e−θ∆1E
[(
zn1e−vw11
) · · · (znJ e−vwJ ) ∣∣∣∆1]]
= E
[
e−θ∆1E
[
zn1e−v(w11+...+wn11) × · · · × znJe−v(w1J+...+wnJJ)
∣∣∣∣∣∆1
]]
= E
[
e−θ∆1E
[
E
[
(zl (v))
n1
∣∣n1]J ∣∣∣∆1]] = E [e−θ∆1E [(g (zl (v)))J ∣∣∣∆1]]
= L [θ + λ− λg (zl (v))] (A.2)
where J is the number of strikes arriving in ∆1, which is a Poisson RV with parameter λ∆1.
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B Properties of the Inverse Operator Dk
In this appendix, we mention some useful properties of the inverse operator Dk, as defined in
(2.21).
(i) Dk is a linear functional.
(ii) Dkx (1 (x)) = 1, where 1(x) = 1 for all x ∈ R.
(iii) If g is an analytic function at 0, then
Dkx
(
xjg (x)
)
= Dk−jx (g (x)) .
(iv) If a (x) =
∞∑
j=0
ajx
j , then
Dkx (a (xy)) =
k∑
j=0
ajy
j .
(v) If b 6= 1, for b ∈ R, then
Dkx
(
1
1− bx
)
=
1− bk+1
1− b .
(vi) If b 6= 1, for a, b ∈ R, then
Dkx
(
1
1− bx
1
1− ax
)
=
1
1− b
k∑
j=0
aj
(
1− bk+1−j) .
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